In this paper, we extend the protocol of classical verification of quantum computations (CVQC) recently proposed by Mahadev to make the verification efficient. Our result is obtained in the following three steps:
Introduction
Can we verify quantum computations by a classical computer? This problem has been a major open problem in the field until Mahadev [Mah18] finally gave an affirmative solution. Specifically, she constructed an interactive protocol between an efficient classical verifier (a BPP machine) and an efficient quantum prover (a BQP machine) where the verifier can verify the result of the BQP computation. (In the following, we call such a protocol a CVQC protocol. 1 ) Soundness of her protocol relies on a computational assumption that the learning with error (LWE) problem [Reg09] is hard for an efficient quantum algorithm, which has been widely used in the field of cryptography. We refer to the extensive survey by Peikert [Pei16] for details about LWE and its cryptographic applications.
Though her result is a significant breakthrough, there are still several drawbacks. First, her protocol has soundness error 3/4, which means that a cheating prover may convince the verifier even if it does not correctly computes the BQP computation with probability at most 3/4. Though we can exponentially reduce the soundness error by sequential repetition, we need super-constant rounds to reduce the soundness error to be negligible. If parallel repetition works to reduce the soundness error, then we need not increase the number of round. However, parallel repetition may not reduce soundness error for computationally sound protocol in general [BIN97, PW07] . Thus, it is still open to construct constant round protocol with negligible soundness error.
Another issue is about verifier's efficiency. In her protocol, for verifying a computation that is done by a quantum computer in time T , the verifier's running time is as large as poly(T ). Considering a situation where a device with weak classical computational power outsources computations to untrusted quantum server, we may want to make the verifier's running time as small as possible. Such a problem has been studied well in the setting where the prover is classical and we know solutions where verifier's running time only logarithmically depends on T [Kil92, Mic00, KRR13, KRR14, GKR15, RRR16, BHK17, BKK + 18, HR18, CCH + 19, KPY19] . Hopefully, we want to obtain a CVQC protocol for classical where the verifier runs in logarithmic time.
Our Results
In this paper, we solve the above drawbacks of the Mahadev's protocol. Our contribution is divided into three parts:
• We show that parallel repetition version of Mahadev's protocol has negligible soundness error.
This gives the first constant round CVQC protocol with negligible soundness error.
• We construct a two-round CVQC protocol in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) [BDF + 11] where a cryptographic hash function is idealized to be a random function that is only accessible as a quantum oracle. This is obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform [FS87, LZ19, DFMS19] to the parallel repetition version of the Mahadev's protocol.
• We construct a two-round CVQC protocol with logarithmic-time verifier in the CRS+QRO model where both prover and verifier can access to a (classical) common reference string generated by a trusted third party in addition to quantum access to QRO. For proving soundness, we assume that a standard model instantiation of our two-round protocol with a concrete hash function (say, SHA-3) is sound and the existence of post-quantum indistinguishability obfuscation [BGI + 12, GGH + 16] and (post-quantum) fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [Gen09] in addition to the quantum hardness of the LWE problem.
Related Works
Verification of Quantum Computation. There are long line of researches on verification of quantum computation. Except for solutions relying on computational assumptions, there are two type of settings where verification of quantum computation is known to be possible. In the first setting, instead of considering purely classical verifier, we assume that a verifier can perform a certain kind of weak quantum computations [BFK09, FK17, ABOEM17, MF18]. In the second setting, we assume that a prover is splitted into two remote servers that share entanglement but do not communicate [RUV13] . Though these works do not give a CVQC protocol in our sense, the advantage is that we need not assume any computational assumption for the proof of soundness, and thus they are incomparable to Mahadev's result and ours. Subsequent to Mahadev's breakthrough result, Gheorghiu and Vidick [GV19] gave a CVQC protocol that also satisfies blindness, which ensures that a prover cannot learn what computation is delegated. We note that their protocol requires polynomial number of rounds.
Concurrent Work. In a concurrent and independent work, Alagic et al. [ACH19] also shows similar results to our first and second results, parallel repetition theorem for the Madadev's protocol and a two-round CVQC protocol by the Fiat-Shamir transform. We note that our third result, a two-round CVQC protocol with efficient verification, is unique in this paper.
Preliminaries
Notations. For a finite set X , x $ ← X means that x is uniformly chosen from X . For finite sets X and Y, Func(X , Y) denotes the set of all functions with domain X and range Y. A function f : N → [0, 1] is said to be negligible if for all polynomial p and sufficiently large n ∈ N, we have f (n) < 1/p(n) and said to be overwhelming if 1 − f is negligible. We denote by poly an unspecified polynomial and by negl an unspecified negligible function. We say that a classical (resp. quantum) algorithm is efficient if it runs in probabilistic polynomial-time (resp. quantum polynominal time). For a quantum or randomized algorithm A, y $ ← A(x) means that A is run on input x and outputs y and y := A(x; r) means that A is run on input x and randomness r and outputs y. For an interactive protocol between a "prover" P and "verifier" V , y $ ← P (x P ), V (x V )) (x P ) means an interaction between them with prover's private input x P verifier's private input x V , and common input x outputs y. We denote by QTIME(T ) a class of languages decided by a quantum algorithm whose running time is at most T . We use n to denote the security parameter throughout the paper.
Learning with Error Problem
Roughly speaking, the learning with error (LWE) is a problem to solve system of noisy linear equations. Regev [Reg09] proved that the hardness of LWE can be reduced to hardness of certain worst-case lattice problems via quantum reductions. We do not give a definition of LWE in this paper since we use the hardness of LWE only for ensuring the soundness of the Mahadev's protocol (Lemma 3.1), which is used as a black-box manner in the rest of the paper. Therefore, we use exactly the same assumption as that used in [Mah18] , to which we refer for detailed definitions and parameter settings for LWE.
Quantum Random Oracle Model
The quantum random oracle model (QROM) [BDF + 11] is an idealized model where a real-world hash function is modeled as a quantum oracle that computes a random function. More precisely, in the QROM, a random function H : X → Y of a certain domain X and range Y is uniformly chosen from Func(X , Y) at the beginning, and every party (including an adversary) can access to a quantum oracle O H that maps |x |y to |x |y ⊕ H(x) . We often abuse notation to denote A H to mean a quantum algorithm A is given oracle O H .
Cryptographic Primitives
Here, we give definitions of cryptographic primitives that are used in this paper. We note that they are only used in Sec 5 where we construct an efficient verifier variant.
Pseudorandom Generator
A post-quantum pseudorandom generator (PRG) is an efficient deterministic classical algorithm PRG : {0, 1} ℓ → {0, 1} m such that for any efficient quantum algorithm A, we have
It is known that there exists a post-quantum PRG for any ℓ = Ω(n) and m = poly(n) assuming post-quantum one-way function [HILL99, Zha12] . Especially, a post-quantum PRG exists assuming the quantum hardness of LWE.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
A post-quantum fully homomorphic encryption consists of four efficient classical algorithm Π FHE = (FHE.KeyGen, FHE.Enc, FHE.Eval, FHE.Dec).
FHE.KeyGen(1 n ):
The key generation algorithm takes the security parameter 1 n as input and outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk.
FHE.Enc(pk, m): The encryption algorithm takes a public key pk and a message m as input, and outputs a ciphertext ct.
FHE.Eval(pk, C, ct): The evaluation algorithm takes a public key pk, a classical circuit C, and a ciphertext ct, and outputs a evaluated ciphertext ct ′ .
FHE.Dec(sk, ct):
The decryption algorithm takes secret key sk and a ciphertext ct as input and outputs a message m or ⊥.
Correctness. For all n ∈ N, (pk, sk) $ ← FHE.KeyGen(1 n ), m and C, we have Pr[FHE.Dec(sk, FHE.Enc(pk, m)) = m] = 1 and Pr[FHE.Dec(sk, FHE.Eval(pk, C, FHE.Enc(pk, m))) = C(m)] = 1.
Post-Quantum CPA-Security. For any efficient quantum adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), we have
FHE is usually constructed by first constructing leveled FHE, where we have to upper bound the depth of a circuit to evaluate at the setup, and then converting it to FHE by the technique called bootstrapping [Gen09] . There have been many constructions of leveled FHE whose (post-quantum) security can be reduced to the (quantum) hardness of LWE [BV11, BGV12, Bra12, GSW13]. FHE can be obtained assuming that any of these schemes is circular secure [CL01] so that it can be upgraded into FHE via bootstrapping. We note that Canetti et al. [CLTV15] gave an alternative transformation from leveled FHE to FHE based on subexponentially secure iO. Correctness. For any n ∈ N, ℓ, T ∈ N, crs ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , Turing machine M and input inp ∈ {0, 1} * such that M (inp) halts in at most T steps and returns a string whose length is at most ℓ, we have
Strong Output-Compressing Randomized Encoding
Efficiency. There exists polynomials p 1 , p 2 , p 3 such that for all n ∈ N, ℓ ∈ N, crs $ ← {0, 1} ℓ :
• If ek $ ← RE.Setup(1 n , 1 ℓ , crs), |ek| ≤ p 1 (n, log ℓ). Post-Quantum Security. There exists a simulator S such that for any M and inp such that M (inp) halts in T * ≤ T steps and |M (inp)| ≤ ℓ and efficient quantum adversary A, 
SNARK in the QROM
Let H : {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} n be a quantum random oracle. A SNARK for an NP language L associated with a relation R in the QROM consists of two efficient oracle-aided classical algorithms P H snark and V H snark . P H snark : It is an instance x and a witness w as input and outputs a proof π.
V H snark : It is an instance x and a proof π as input and outputs ⊤ indicating acceptance or ⊥ indicating rejection.
We require SNARK to satisfy the following properties:
Extractability. There exists an efficient quantum extractor Ext such that for any x and a malicious quantum proverP H snark making at most q = poly(n) queries, if
is non-negligible in n, then
is non-negligible in n.
Efficient Verification. If we can verify that (x, w) ∈ R in classical time T , then for any π $ ← P H snark (x), V H snark (x, π) runs in classical time poly(n, |x|, log T ). Chiesa et al. [CMS19] showed that there exists SNARK in the QROM that satisfies the above properties.
Parallel Repetition of Mahadev's Protocol

Overview of Mahadev's Protocol
Here, we recall the Mahadev's protocol [Mah18] . We only give a high-level description of the protocol and properties of it and omit the details since they are not needed to show our result.
The protocol is run between a quantum prover P and a classical verifier V on a common input x. The aim of the protocol is to enable a verifier to classically verify x ∈ L for a BQP language L with the help of interactions with a quantum prover. The protocol is a 4-round protocol where the first message is sent from V to P . We denote the i-th message generation algorithm by V i for i ∈ {1, 3} or P i for i ∈ {2, 4} and denote the verifier's final decision algorithm by V out . Then a high-level description of the protocol is given below.
V 1 : On input the security parameter 1 n and x, it generates a pair (k, td) of a"key" and "trapdoor", sends k to P , and keeps td as its internal state.
On input x and k, it generates a classical "commitment" y along with a quantum state |st P , sends y to P , and keeps |st P as its internal state.
V 3 : It randomly picks c $ ← {0, 1} and sends c to P . 2 For a knowledgeable reader, the case of c = 0 corresponds to the "test round" and the case of c = 1 corresponds to the "Hadamard round" in the terminology in [Mah18] . P 4 : On input |st P and c, it generates a classical string a and sends a to P .
V out : On input k, td, y, c, and a, it returns ⊤ indicating acceptance or ⊥ indicating rejection. In case c = 0, the verification can be done publicly, that is, V out need not take td as input.
For the protocol, we have the following properties: Completeness: For all x ∈ L, we have Pr[ P, V (x)] = ⊥] = negl(n). Soundness: If the LWE problem is hard for quantum polynomial-time algorithms, then for any x / ∈ L and a quantum polynomial-time cheating prover P * , we have Pr[ P * , V (x)] = ⊥] ≤ 3/4. We need a slightly different form of soundness implicitly shown in [Mah18] , which roughly says that if a cheating prover can pass the "test round" (i.e., the case of c = 0) with overwhelming probability, then it can pass the "Hadamard round" (i.e., the case of c = 1) only with a negligible probability.
Lemma 3.1 (implicit in [Mah18] ). If the LWE problem is hard for quantum polynomial-time algorithms, then for any x / ∈ L and a quantum polynomial-time cheating prover P * such that
We will also use the following simple fact: Fact 1. There exists an efficient prover that passes the test round with probability 1 (but passes the Hadamard round with probability 0) even if x / ∈ L.
Parallel Repetition
Here, we prove that the parallel repetition of the Mahadev's protocol decrease the soundness bound to be negligible. Let P m and V m be m-parallel repetitions of the honest prover P and verifier V in the Mahadev's protocol. Then we have the following:
Theorem 3.2 (Completeness). For all m = Ω(log 2 (n)), for all x ∈ L, we have Pr[ P m , V m (x)] = ⊥] = negl(n).
Theorem 3.3 (Soundness). For all m = Ω(log 2 (n)), if the LWE problem is hard for quantum polynomial-time algorithms, then for any x / ∈ L and a quantum polynomial-time cheating prover P * , we have Pr[ P * , V m (x)] = ⊤] ≤ negl(n).
The completeness (Theorem 3.2) easily follows from the completeness of the Mahadev's protocol. In the next subsection, we prove the soundness (Theorem 3.3).
Proof of Soundness
We prove the soundness by showing that for all noticeable error ǫ, there exists a number m such that by parallelly repeating the protocol m times, the error can be reduced to less than ǫ. Characterization of cheating prover. Any cheating prover can be characterized by a tuple
Second Message: Upon receiving k = (k 1 , ..., k m ), it applies U 0 to the state |0 X ⊗ |0 Z ⊗ |0 Y ⊗ |k K , and then measures the Y register to obtain y = (y 1 , ..., y m ). Then it sends y to V and keeps the resulting state |ψ(k, y) over H X,Z .
Forth Message: Upon receiving c ∈ {0, 1} m , it applies U c to |ψ(k, y) X,Z |0 C and then measures the X register in computational basis to obtain a = (a 1 , ..., a m ). We denote the designated register for a i by X i . Then, we can view the verifier's verification procedure on ith trial as a unitary V i .
In the following, we first introduced the Jordan's lemma, which we will use to prove Lemma 3.5.
Lemma 3.4 (Jordan's lemma). Given any two projectors Π 1 and Π 2 . There exists a decomposition of the Hilbert space into one-dimensional and two-dimensional subspaces, which satisfy the following properties:
• All subspaces are orthogonal to each other.
• For any two-dimensional subspace S, for all |s ∈ S, Π 1 |s ∈ S and Π 2 |s ∈ S.
• For any two-dimensional subspace S, Π 1 and Π 2 are rank-one projectors, i.e., there exist two vectors |v 1 and |v 2 in S such that for all |s ∈ S, Π 1 |s = v 1 |s |v 1 and Π 2 |s = v 2 |s |v 2 .
Fix k, y and the function f . Let i ∈ [m], we consider two projectors
where U can be any prover's strategy.
. . , C m . By using Jordan's lemma, we can decompose the space H C,X,Z in the two-dimensional subspaces S 1 , . . . , S ℓ and one-dimensional subspaces S ℓ+1 , . . . , S p ′ which are vectors on either Π in or Π i,out . Furthermore, Π in and Π i,out on S 1 , . . . , S p ′ are rank-one projectors |α 1 α 1 |, . . . , |α p ′ α p ′ | and |β 1 β 1 |, . . . ,
we let the angles between |α j and |β j as θ j . Then, we define projectors
Then, there exists an efficient quantum algorithm G i,γ,δ such that for any efficiently generated quantum state |ψ X,Z ,
Furthermore, the following properties are satisfied.
1. If we define |ψ err X,
where M ph,th,in is the standard-basis measurement in the register (ph, th, in), and t is the number of qubits in ph. Furthermore,
This implies that there exists an polynomial-time cheating prover with |ψ 1 that can be accepted in the test round with 1 − negl(n) probability.
Remark 1. To prove Theorem 3.3, we only need m to be at most log(n). Hence, γ 0 and T can be 1/poly(n).
Proof of Lemma 3.5. We can consider U c as a unitary U operating on registers C, X, and Z. Procedure 1 defines an efficient process G i,γ,δ , which decomposes |0 C |ψ X,Z into states described in Lemma 3.5.
We define R 1 := I − 2Π i,out , R 2 := 2Π in − I, and Q := R 2 R 1 .
1. Do quantum phase estimation U est on Q with input state |ψ and t-bit precision for parameter t which will be specified later, i.e.,
Here, G i,γ,δ := U in U † est U th U est operates on register C, X, Z, and additional registers ph, th, and in.
We let |u
, which are eigenvectors of Q. For each one-dimensional subspace, it is either a vector in Π in or Π i,out . We only consider vectors in Π in , and denote them as |α ℓ+1 , . . . , |α p . Obviously, they are also eigenvectors of Q (with eigenvalues equal to zero). The eigenvalues corresponding to |u + j are e iθ j and |u − j are e i(2π−θ j ) . Now, we can decompose any input state as
We suppose that |ψ are on the two-dimensional subspaces without loss of generality. Then, since each |α j for j ∈ [ℓ] can be represented as a + j |u + j + a − j |u − j , we rewrite the state in the basis of eigenvectors as
where e + j = a + j d j and e − j = a − j d j . We define a function
In the following, we apply U est and U th to the state in Eq. 1 to estimate the eigenvalues of each |u j .
Here
for b ± j the best t bit approximation to θ ± j which is less than θ ± j for j ∈ [ℓ]. To successfully obtain θ j with accuracy δ with probability 1 − ǫ for ǫ be negligible, we can choose t = O(log n). Note that simply applying phase estimation with O(log n)-bit precision can not guarantee ǫ to be negligible. However, by parallelly applying phase estimation polynomially times and taking the most commonly occurring outcome, one can reduce ǫ to be negligible as shown by Watrous in [Wat06] .
By applying U † est , the state above will be
. We can rewrite the state above in the basis of |α 1 , . . . , |α p .
Notably, the state Eq. 16 can only have expected norm 1/T over the choice of γ ∈ { γ 0 T , 2γ 0 T , . . . , γ 0 }. Moreover, the norms of states in Eq. 14 and Eq. 15 can only be negligible since the phase estimation has success probability at least 1 − negl(n).
By applying U in , we can write the output state of G i,γ,δ as 
Here, |η and |η ′ are errors from the states in Eq. 15 and Eq. 14 after applying U in . Furthermore, the range of θ j has been changed from [γ, 2π − γ] to [γ − 2δ, 2π − γ + 2δ] in Eq. 12 and from [γ − 2δ, 2π − γ + 2δ] to [γ, 2π − γ] in Eq. 17 and Eq. 18. This follows from the fact that there can be additional state from the state in Eq. 16 after applying U in . Therefore, |η and |η ′ can only be negligible, and the probability that measuring the register ph, th, in of the state gives neither 0 t 11 nor 0 t+1 1 is at most 1/T + negl(n). We then define
|ψ err := |ψ − |ψ 0 − |ψ 1 .
It is worth noting that
Now, we are going to prove that the five properties of the lemma are correct. First, it is obvious that |ψ = |ψ 0 + |ψ 1 + |ψ err . Then, as we have explained in the previous paragraph, the probability that measuring the register ph, th, in of the state gives neither 0 t 11 nor 0 t+1 1 is at most 1/T + negl(n). Then, we prove that E γ [ |ψ err 2 ] is at most 1/T + negl(n). The errors come from the state in Eq. 6 are on the eigenvectors with eigenvalues in [γ − 2δ, γ] ∨ [2π − γ, 2π − γ + 2δ], therefore, the error can be at most j:θ j ∈[γ−2δ,γ]∨[2π−γ,2π−γ+2δ] ||e + j | 2 + |e − j | 2 , which expected value is at most 1/T over the choice of γ. The errors from the states in Eq. 15 and Eq. 14 are at most negligible. This proves the second property. Then, |ψ 0 and |ψ 1 may not be orthogonal. However, |ψ 0 2 + |ψ 1 2 ≤ 1 since |0 C |ψ 0 X,Z |001 + |0 C |ψ 1 X,Z |011 2 ≤ 1 and |0 C |ψ 0 X,Z |001 and |0 C |ψ 1 X,Z |011 are orthogonal. This also implies that
This follow from the fact that on average over In Lemma 3.5, we show that by fixing any i ∈ [m], we can partition any prover's state into |ψ 0 , |ψ 1 , and |ψ err such that |ψ 0 and |ψ 1 will be rejected and accepted in the test round with high probability.
In the following, we show another procedure that further decompose the prover's state according to any given c ∈ {0, 1} n .
Lemma 3.6. For any c ∈ {0, 1} m , the state |ψ can be partitioned as follows by using Procedure 2. |ψ = |ψ c 1 + |ψc 1 ,c 2 + · · · + |ψc 1 ,...,c m−1 ,cm + |ψc 1 ,...,cm + |ψ err .
Further, the following properties are satisfied. For any c ∈ {0, 1} m , we have 1. For any i ∈ [m], |ψc 1 ,...,c i−1 ,0 is rejected in the ith test round with probability at most 2 m γ.
2. There exists an polynomial-time cheating prover with |ψc 1 ,...,c i−1 ,1 that can be accepted in the test round with 1 − negl(n) probability.
3. E γ 1 ,...,γm [ |ψ err 2 ] ≤ m 2 T + negl(n). Moreover, for any fixed γ, we have E c [ |ψc 1 ,...,cm 2 ] ≤ 2 −m .
Procedure 2 H c
Let (ph 1 , th 1 , in 1 ), . . . , (ph m , th m , in m ) be additional registers that H c will use.
1. Sample γ 1 from { γ 0 T , 2γ 0 T , . . . , γ 0 }. Apply G 1,γ 1 ,δ on |ψ |0 ph 1 ,th 1 ,in 1 to obtain
2. For i = 2, . . . , m,
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on i ∈ [m]. When i = 1,
where |ψ 0 , |ψ 1 , and |ψ err 1 satisfy all the properties of Lemma 3.6 according to Lemma 3.5. We suppose the hypothesis is true when i = k. Then, when i = k + 1, we can decompose the state |ψ as follows |ψ = |ψ c 1 + |ψc 1 ,c 2 + · · · + |ψc 1 ,...,c k ,c k+1 + |ψc 1 ,...,c k ,c k+1 + k+1 j=1 |ψ err j . |ψc 1 ,...,c k ,c k also satisfies the first two properties according to Lemma 3.5, and the third property follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Finally, as E[|ψc 1 ,...,c k ] ≤ 2 −k , it is obvious that E[|ψc 1 ,...,c k ,c k=1 ] ≤ 2 −(k+1) according to Lemma 3.5.
Given Lemma 3.6, we can start proving Theorem 3.3. 
In the following, we just write |ψ to mean |ψ(k, y) . For each i ∈ [m], let V i,0 and V i,1 be unitaries that run the verification procedure in the test and Hadamard round on the i-th trial and write the verification result in a designated register and M i be the measurement on the designated register on the i-th trial. For any state |φ , we denote M • |φ = ⊤ to mean M i • |φ = ⊤ for all i ∈ [m] for notational simplicity. With this notation, a cheating prover's success probability can be written as
According to Lemma 3.6, for any fixed c ∈ {0, 1} m , we can decompose |ψ as |ψ = |ψ c 1 + |ψc 1 ,c 2 + · · · + |ψc 1 ,...,c m−1 ,cm + |ψc 1 ,...,c m−1 ,cm + |ψ err .
To prove the theorem, we first show the following two inequalities holds for any i ∈ [m] and fixed c ∈ {0, 1} m :
(20)
Eq. 20 easily follows from the first claim of Lemma 3.6 and γ ≤ γ 0 . For proving Eq. 21, we consider a modified cheating adversary described below:
1. Given k, it runs the first stage of the adversary to obtain y along with the corresponding state |ψ = |ψ(k, y) .
2. Apply G 1,γ,δ ,....,G i−1,γ,δ sequantially to obtain the state |ψc 1 ,...,c i−1 ,1 , which succeeds in nonnegligible probability since we assume the LHS of Eq. 21 is non-negligible. We denote by Succ the event that it succeeds in generating the state. If it fails to generate the state, then it override y by picking it in a way such that it can pass the test round with probability 1, which can be done according to Fact 1. Then it sends y to the verifier.
3. Given a challenge c i , it works as follows:
• When c i = 0 (i.e., Test round), if Succ occurred, then it runs the cheating prover that is assumed to exist in the second claim of Lemma 3.6 to generate an forth message accepted with overwhelming probability. If Succ did not occur, then it returns a forth message accepted with probability 1, which is possible by Fact 1.
• When c i = 0 (i.e., Hadamard round), if Succ occurred, then it runs the second stage of the adversary with the internal state |ψc 1 ,...,c i−1 ,1 to generate the forth message a. If Succ did not occur, it just aborts.
Then we can see that this cheating adversary passes the test round with overwhelming probability and passes the Hadamard round with the probability equal to the LHS of Eq. 21. Therefore, Eq. 21 follows from Lemma 3.1. Now, we are ready to prove the theorem. First, we remark that it suffices to show that for any µ = 1/poly(n), there exists m = O(log(n)) such that the success probability of the cheating prover is at most µ. This is because we are considering ω(log(n))-parallel repetition, in which case the number of trials is larger than any m = O(log(n)) for sufficiently large n, and thus we can do the same analyses focusing on the first m trials and ignoring the rest of the trials. Specifically, we set m = log 1 µ 2 , γ 0 = 2 −2m , and T = 2 m . Then we have
The first inequality follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. The second inequality follows from the fact that V 1 , . . . , V m commute, and thus we can choose V i,c i to be the first operator operating on |ψc 1 ,...,c i−1 ,c i . The third inequality follows from Eq. 20 and 21, which give an upper bound of the first term and Lemma 3.6, which give upper bounds of the second and third terms. The last inequality follows from our choices of γ 0 , T , and m.
Two-Round Protocol via Fiat-Shamir Transform
In this section, we show that if we apply the Fiat-Shamir transform to m-parallel version of the Mahadev's protocol, then we obtain two-round protocol in the QROM. That is, we prove the following theorem. Proof. Let m > n be a sufficiently large integer so that m-parallel version of the Mahadev's protocol has negligible soundness. For notational simplicity, we abuse the notation to simply use V i , P i , and V out to mean the m-parallel repetitions of them. Let H : Y → {0, 1} m be a hash function idealized as a quantum random oracle where X is the space of the second message y and Y = {0, 1} m . Our two-round protocol is described below:
First Message: The verifier runs V 1 to generate (k, td). Then it sends k to the prover and keeps td as its state.
Second Message: The prover runs P 2 on input k to generate y along with the prover's state |st P . Then set c := H(y), and runs P 4 on input |st P and y to generate a. Finally, it returns (y, a) to the verifier.
Verification: The verifier computes c = H(y), runs V out (k, td, y, c, a), and outputs as V out outputs.
It is clear that the completeness is preserved given that H is a random oracle. We reduce the soundness of this protocol to the soundness of m-parallel version of the Mahadev's protocol. For proving this, we borrow the following lemma shown in [DFMS19] .
Lemma 4.2 ([DFMS19, Theorem 2]). Let Y be finite non-empty sets. There exists a black-box polynomial-time two-stage quantum algorithm S with the following property. Let A be an arbitrary oracle quantum algorithm that makesueries to a uniformly random H : Y → {0, 1} m and that outputs some y ∈ Y and output a. Then, the two-stage algorithm S A outputs y ∈ Y in the first stage and, upon a random c ∈ {0, 1} m as input to the second stage, output a so that for any x • ∈ X and any predicate V :
where (y, a) $ ← S A , c means that S A outputs y and a in the first and second stages respectively on the second stage input c.
We assume that there exists an efficient adversary A that breaks the soundness of the above two-round protocol. We fix x / ∈ L on which A succeeds in cheating. We fix (k, td) that is in the support of the verifier's first message. We apply Lemma 4.2 for A = A(k) and V = V out (k, td, ·, ·, ·), to obtain an algorithm S A(k) that satisfies which is non-negligible in n. This contradicts the soundness of m-parallel version of Mahadev's protocol (Theorem 3.3). Therefore we conclude that there does not exists an adversary that succeeds in the two-round protocol with non-negligible probability assuming LWE in the QROM.
Making Verifier Efficient
In this section, we construct a CVQC protocol with efficient verification in the CRS+QRO model where a classical common reference string is available for both prover and verifier in addition to quantum access to QRO. Our main theorem in this section is stated as follows:
Theorem 5.1. Assuming LWE assumption and existence of post-quantum iO, post-quantum FHE, and two-round CVQC protocol in the standard model, there exists a two-round CVQC protocol for QTIME(T ) with verification complexity poly(n, log T ) in the CRS+QRO model.
Remark 2. One may think that the underlying two-round CVQC protocol can be in the QROM instead of in the standard model since we rely on the QROM anyway. However, this is not the case since we need to use the underlying two-round CVQC in a non-black box way, which cannot be done if that is in the QROM. Since our two-round protocol given in Sec. 4 is only proven secure in the QROM, we do not know any two-round CVQC protocol provably secure in the standard model. On the other hand, it is widely used heuristic in cryptography that a scheme proven secure in the QROM is also secure in the standard model if the QRO is instantiated by a well-designed cryptographic hash function such as SHA-3. Therefore, we believe that it is reasonable to assume that a standard model instantiation of the scheme in Sec. 4 with a concrete hash function is sound.
Remark 3. One may think we need not assume CRS in addition to QRO since CRS may be replaced with an output of QRO. This can be done if CRS is just a uniformly random string. However, in our construction, CRS is non-uniform and has a certain structure. Therefore we cannot implement CRS by QRO.
Preparation
First, we prepare a lemma that is used in our security proof.
Lemma 5.2. For any finite sets X and Y and two-stage oracle-aided quantum algorithm A = (A 1 , A 2 ), we have
where q 1 denotes the maximal number of queries by A 1 .
This can be proven similarly to [SXY18, Lemma 2.2]. We give a proof in Appendix A for completeness.
Four-Round Protocol
First, we construct a four-round scheme with efficient verification, which is transformed into tworound protocol in the next subsection. Our construction is based on the following building blocks:
• A two-round CVQC protocol Π = (P = P 2 , V = (V 1 , V out )) in the standard model, which works as follows:
V 1 : On input the security parameter 1 n and x, it generates a pair (k, td) of a"key" and "trapdoor", sends k to P , and keeps td as its internal state. P 2 : On input x and k, it generates a response e and sends it to V . V out : On input x, k, td, e, it returns ⊤ indicating acceptance or ⊥ indicating rejection.
• A post-quantum PRG PRG : {0, 1} ℓs → {0, 1} ℓr where ℓ r is the length of randomness for V 1 .
• An FHE scheme Π FHE = (FHE.KeyGen, FHE.Enc, FHE.Eval, FHE.Dec) with post-quantum CPA security.
• A strong output compressing randomized encoding scheme Π RE = (RE.Setup, RE.Enc, RE.Dec) with post-quantum security. We denote the simulator for Π RE by S re .
• A SNARK Π SNARK = (P snark , V snark ) in the QROM for an NP language L snark defined below:
We have (x, pk fhe , ct, ct ′ ) ∈ L snark if and only if there exists e such that ct ′ = FHE.Eval(pk fhe , C[x, e], ct) where C[x, e] is a circuit that works as follows: and T ′ is specified later. Then it sends ( M inp , pk fhe , ct) to P eff and keeps sk fhe as its internal state. snark ((x, pk fhe , ct, ct ′ ), π snark ) = ⊤ and 1 ← FHE.Dec(sk fhe , ct ′ ) and ⊥ otherwise.
Choice of parameters.
• We set ℓ to be an upper bound of the length of k where (k, td) $ ← V 1 (1 n , x) for x ∈ L T . We note that we have ℓ = poly(n, T ).
• We set T ′ to be an upperbound of the running time of M on input s ∈ {0, 1} ℓs when x ∈ L T .
We note that we have T ′ = poly(n, T ).
Verification Efficiency. By encoding efficiency of Π RE and verification efficiency of Π SNARK , V eff runs in time poly(n, |x|, log T ).
Theorem 5.3 (Completeness). For any x ∈ L T ,
Proof. This easily follows from completeness and correctness of the underlying primitives.
Theorem 5.4 (Soundness). For any x / ∈ L T any efficient quantum cheating prover A,
Proof. We fix T and x / ∈ L T . Let A be a cheating prover. First, we divides A into the first stage A 1 , which is given (crs P eff , crs V eff ) and the first message and outputs the second message ct ′ and its internal state |st A , and the second stage A 2 , which is given the internal state |st A and the third message and outputs the fourth message π snark . We consider the following sequence of games between an adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and a challenger. Let q 1 and q 2 be an upper bound of number of random oracle queries by A 1 and A 2 , respectively. We denote the event that the challenger returns 1 in Game i by T i .
Game 1 : This is the original soundness game. Specifically, the game runs as follows: (|st A , z).
5.
The challenger returns 1 if e is a valid witness for (x, pk fhe , ct, ct ′ ) ∈ L snark and 1 ← FHE.Dec(sk fhe , ct ′ ) and 0 otherwise.
Game 4 : This game is identical to the previous game except that
Step 5 is modified as follows:
5. The challenger returns 1 if e is a valid witness for (x, pk fhe , ct, ct ′ ) ∈ L snark , and V out (x, k, td, e) = ⊤ where (k, td) $ ← V 1 (1 n , x; P RG(s)) and 0 otherwise.
Game 5 : This game is identical to the previous game except that ct is generated as ct $ ← FHE.Enc(pk fhe , 0 2n ) in Step 1.
Game 6 : This game is identical to the previous game except that crs re , ek re , and M inp are generated in a different way. Specifically, in Step 1, the challenger computes (k, td) $ ← V 1 (1 n , x; P RG(s)), (crs re , M inp ) $ ← S re (1 n , 1 |M | , 1 ℓs , k, T * ), and ek re $ ← RE.Setup(1 n , 1 ℓ , crs re ) where T * is the running time of M (inp). We note that the same (k, td) generated in this step is also used in
Step 5.
Game 7 : This game is identical to the previous game except that P RG(s) used for generating (k, td)
in Step 1 is replaced with a true randomness.
This completes the descriptions of games. Our goal is to prove Pr[T 1 ] = negl(n). We prove this by the following lemmas. Since Lemmas 5.8, 5.9, and 5.10 can be proven by straightforward reductions, we only give proofs for the rest of lemmas.
Lemma 5.5. We have | Pr[T 2 ] − Pr[T 1 ]| ≤ q 1 2 −(n+1) .
Proof. This lemma is obtained by applying Lemma 5.2 for B = (B 1 , B 2 ) described below: snark ((x, pk fhe , ct, ct ′ ), π snark ) = ⊤ and 1 ← FHE.Dec(sk fhe , ct ′ ) and 0 otherwise.
Lemma 5.6. If Π SNARK satisfies the extractability and Pr[T 2 ] is non-negligible, then Pr[T 3 ] is also non-negligible.
Proof. Let trans 3 be the transcript of the protocol before the forth message is sent (i.e., trans 3 = (crs P eff , crs V eff , M inp , pk fhe , ct ′ , z)). We say that (H, sk fhe , trans 3 , |st A ) is good if we randomly choose G $ ← Func({0, 1} 2n , {0, 1} n ) and run π snark $ ← A H[z,G] 2 (|st A ) to complete the transcript, then the transcript is accepted (i.e., we have V G snark ((x, pk fhe , ct, ct ′ ), π snark ) = ⊤ and 1 ← FHE.Dec(sk fhe , ct ′ )) with non-negligible probability. By a standard averaging argument, if Pr[T 2 ] is non-negligible, then a non-negligible fraction of (H, sk fhe , trans 3 , |st A ) is good when they are generated as in Game 2 . We fix good (trans 3 , sk fhe , |st A ). Then by the extractability of Π SNARK , Ext succeeds in extracting a witness for (x, pk fhe , ct, ct ′ ) ∈ L snark with non-negligible probability. Moreover, since we assume (H, sk fhe , trans 3 , |st A ) is good, we always have 1 ← FHE.Dec(sk fhe , ct ′ ) (since otherwise a transcript with prefix trans 3 cannot be accepted). Therefore we can conclude that Pr[T 3 ] is non-negligible. Proof. If e is a valid witness for (x, pk fhe , ct, ct ′ ) ∈ L snark , then we especially have ct ′ = FHE.Eval(pk fhe , C[x, e], ct). By the correctness of Π FHE , we have FHE.Dec(sk fhe , ct ′ ) = C[x, e](s) = (V out (x, k, td, e) ? = ⊤) where (k, td) $ ← V 1 (1 n , x; P RG(s)). Therefore, the challenger returns 1 in Game 4 if and only if it returns 1 in Game 3 .
Lemma 5.8. If Π FHE is CPA-secure, then we have | Pr[T 5 ] − Pr[T 4 ]| ≤ negl(n).
Lemma 5.9. If Π RE is secure, then we have | Pr[T 6 ] − Pr[T 5 ]| ≤ negl(n).
Lemma 5.10. If PRG is secure, then we have | Pr[T 7 ] − Pr[T 6 ]| ≤ negl(n).
Lemma 5.11. If (P, V ) satisfies soundness, then we have Pr[T 7 ] ≤ negl(n).
Proof. Suppose that Pr[T 7 ] is non-negligible. Then we construct an adversary B against the underlying two-round protocol as follows: ← S re (1 n , 1 |M | , 1 ℓs , k, T * ), ek re $ ← RE.Setup(1 n , 1 ℓ , crs re ), and (pk fhe , sk fhe ) $ ← FHE.KeyGen(1 n ), computes ct $ ← FHE.Enc( pk fhe , 0 2n ), and sets crs P eff = crs re and crs V eff := ek re . Then it runs (ct ′ , |st A ) $ ← A H 1 (crs P eff , crs V eff , x, ( M inp , pk fhe , ct)) and e $ ← Ext A ′ 2 [H,|st A ,z] ((x, pk fhe , ct, ct ′ ), 1 q 2 , 1 n ) and outputs e.
Then we can easily see that the probability that we have V out (x, k, td, e) is at least Pr[T 7 ]. Therefore, if the underlying two-round protocol is sound, then Pr[T 7 ] = negl(n).
By combining Lemmas 5.5 to 5.10, we can see that if Pr[T 1 ] is non-negligible, then Pr[T 7 ] is also non-negligible, which contradicts Lemma 5.11. Therefore we conclude that Pr[T 1 ] = negl(n).
Reducing to Two-Round via Fiat-Shamir
Here, we show that the number of rounds can be reduced to 2 relying on another random oracle. Namely, we observe that the third message of the scheme is just a public coin, and so we can apply the Fiat-Shamir transform similarly to Sec.4. In the following, we describe the protocol for completeness.
Our two-round CVQC protocol (Setup eff-fs , P eff-fs , V eff-fs = (V eff-fs,1 , V eff-fs,out )) for L T in the CRS+QRO model is described as follows. Let H : {0, 1} 2n × {0, 1} 2n → {0, 1} n be a quantum random oracle and H ′ : {0, 1} ℓ ct ′ → {0, 1} 2n be another quantum random oracle where ℓ ct ′ is the maximal length of ct ′ in the four-round scheme and ℓ and T ′ be as defined in the previous section.
Setup eff-fs (1 n ): The setup algorithm takes the security parameter 1 n as input, generates crs re $ ← {0, 1} ℓ and computes ek re $ ← RE.Setup(1 n , 1 ℓ , crs re ). Then it outputs a CRS for verifier crs V eff-fs := ek re and a CRS for prover crs P eff-fs := crs re . V H,H ′ eff-fs,1 : Given crs V eff-fs = ek re and x, it generates s
